ABSTRACT With the continuous development of multimedia technology, a growing number of multimedia applications have emerged. The demand for multimedia services continues to grow. But the development of multimedia services is still hampered by inherent security. Privacy and integrity of multimedia data are two key issues for implementing mobile multimedia security. At present, most data privacy-preserving solutions have a trusted third party, which may become the bottleneck of the system. And, the computational efficiency of the client is inefficient. In this paper, a lightweight and privacy-preserving data aggregation for mobile multimedia is proposed. In the proposed scheme, the terminal calculation is lightweight and there is no trusted third party in our scheme. Besides, multimedia big data and personal multimedia data are balanced by creating virtual aggregation areas and the system performance is improved by adopting batch verification in our scheme. Security analysis shows that the presented scheme can guarantee the privacy, confidentiality and integrity of the personal multimedia data. The performance analysis indicates the proposed scheme is lightweight.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid development of information technology, multimedia equipment is developing towards low power consumption and intelligent direction to support various information services [1] . For example, Facebook shares 685,000 content and Google carries out 2,000,000 video queries [2] . Multimedia data accounts for two-thirds of Internet traffic [3] , [4] . The rapid development of data traffic not only leads to an increase in communication requirements, but also leads to an increase in computing requirements, which will consume a lot of resources [5] , [6] . Multimedia applications, such as multimedia center online video, live broadcast, etc., are widely used in people's daily lives.
It is necessary to analyze the data of mobile multimedia to better serve users. With the timely utility of these mobile multimedia big data, the data center can make scientific decisions and improve the quality of service. Besides, these
The associate editor coordinating the review of this article and approving it for publication was Dapeng Wu. mobile multimedia big data can be used for major enterprise's decision-making and business activities [7] . However, personal multimedia data is related to personal privacy. For example, users' hobbies and habits can be inferred from personal multimedia data. If this information is mastered by malicious users, which may cause serious losses to the owner of the data. One of the problems to be solved in multimedia to balance the multimedia big data's utility and personal multimedia data. In the IoT and smart grid scenarios, to solve personal data privacy issues, many privacy protection data aggregation schemes [8] - [11] have been proposed. In these schemes, there are two basic requirements. On the one hand, the data center can get total data. On the other hand, personal data is hidden.
Homomorphic encryption (HE) [12] , [13] is widely employed in the data aggregation owing to the nature of HE. However, it is imperfect to rely solely on HE [14] for data security. HE and authentication technology need to be combined. Only in this way can the confidentiality, authentication and integrity of data be guaranteed. Many data aggregation VOLUME 7, 2019 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ schemes [9] , [11] are based on trusted third parties, which becomes a bottleneck in the system. Besides, they can not resist the attack of internal enemies. In addition, multimedia involves a large number of multimedia devices. If the gateway sends a single data to DC, the privacy of personal multimedia data will not be protected. Certificate-based system [15] will have the problem of key escrow. And, the calculating costs of the mobile multimedia device should be also lightweight.
A. RELATED WORK
User's multimedia data is related to user's privacy, under certain circumstances personal multimedia data is obtained by malicious users which may cause serious economic consequences for data owners. Many efforts are also working to address privacy issues [16] - [18] . Zhang et al. proposed two fair payment schemes for outsourced data security based on the Bitcoin blockchain [19] and the Ethereum blockchain [20] . In the multimedia scenario, some data aggregation schemes [21] - [23] are proposed. Sun et al. [21] presented a data aggregation scheme with a trust mechanism to enhance data credibility. Wu et al. [22] presented a privacy protection multimedia big data aggregation scheme. Qiu et al. [23] presented a k-anonymous privacypreserving scheme and corresponding data transmission strategy for participatory cognitive multimedia networks by integrating data encoding technology and message transmission strategy. However, this scheme may not be enough to protect privacy, because mobile users or customers can be re-identified by combining different types of information [24] . Zhang et al. [25] proposed an attribute-based encryption scheme which supports hidden access policies and can be used to realize privacy aware access control. Besides, Zhang et al. [26] proposed a handover authentication scheme which is suitable for all the mobile application scenarios in 5G. The security of the scheme is formally proved. Besides, some data aggregation schemes [27] - [29] based on the Paillier encryption are proposed to protect data privacy. The gateway will receive the data sent by the user, and the data will be aggregated and sent to data center. However, in these scenarios, there is the assumption that the gateway is trusted. If the gateway sends a single data to data center, the privacy of data will not be protected. Besides, data aggregation schemes based on the Paillier encryption is inefficient.
Liu et al. [30] proposed a practical privacy preservation data aggregation scheme. However, there are problems in the scheme where certificate management is insufficient and bilinearity leads to inefficiency. Cui et al. [31] proposed an efficient certificateless aggregate signature without pairings. The scheme adopts a certificateless batch verification, which greatly improves the efficiency. Inspired by this scheme, due to the large amount of multimedia data, we applyed the batch verification to the authentication of multimedia data, which can greatly improve the authentication efficiency.
B. OUR CONTRIBUTIONS
A lightweight data aggregation scheme is presented. The main contributions of our scheme can be summarized as follows:
• Firstly, the utility of multimedia big data and personal multimedia data are balanced by creating virtual aggregation areas.
• Secondly, the certificateless batch verification technology is used to avoid the key escrow problem of a large number of multimedia terminals.
• Thirdly, the proposed scheme does not involve time-consuming bilinear pairs, which makes the calculation of multimedia terminals and data collection units lightweight. And our scheme can resist dishonest gateways.
C. ORGANIZATION
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In section II, the preliminaries are introduced. Next, the model and design goals of our scheme are presented in section III. The concrete scheme is introduced in section IV. Correctness analysis and security analysis are introduced in section V. After that, the performance of the scheme is analyzed in section VI. Finally, in section VII, we make a conclusion.
II. PRELIMINARIES
We introduce the description of the symbols, lifted EC-ElGamal cryptosystem and certificateless signature scheme in this section.
A. NOTATIONS
We describe the symbols involved in lifted EC-ElGamal cryptosystem, certificateless signature and our scheme as shown in Table 1 . 
B. LIFTED EC-ELGAMAL CRYPTOSYSTEM
In this part, we review the Lifted EC-ElGamal cryptosystem [32] , [33] , which is a HE algorithm.
• Key generation: The algorithm is based on the elliptic curve group E(F p ) of the prime order q with a generator P. Its private and public keys are x ∈ Z * q and 114132 VOLUME 7, 2019 Y = x · P, respectively. Besides, the public parameters of the system are (E(F p ), q, P).
• Encryption:
where r ∈ Z * q is selected randomly and K q.
• Decryption: The message m can be obtained from
− xC a ). Owing to K q, the time complexity of decryption is O( √ K ) by the Pollard's lambda algorithm [34] .
• Distributed decryption: Suppose there are n users in a group. Private and public keys of the user
of the data m can be generated using GK . When decrypting, the decryption operator needs to interact with user U i [34] . The decryption operator sends C a to U i , (i = 1, ..., n), and then U i returns D i to the decryption operator, where D i = x i C a . The decryption operator can recover the message m using the equation
Distributed decryption can also be done in a subset of users within a group [30] .
C. CERTIFICATELESS SIGNATURE SCHEME
In the scheme [31] , aggregation and batch validation of data from n users can be realized simultaneously. In our scheme, we mainly employ the batch authentication of the scheme [31] .
• Key generation: Cui et al.'s scheme [31] is based on the elliptic curve E(F q ) of prime order q. Let P pub = αP and T pub = βP be the public keys of the key generation center (KGC) and the trace authority (TRA), respectively. The public system parameters are Params = (P, p, q, E, G, H 1 , H 2 , P pub , T pub ), where
The private keys of KGC and TRA are α ∈ Z * q and β ∈ Z * q , respectively. The vehicle V i can get part of the key (
• Signature: V i chooses a random number
) and S i = h i y i + psk VID i mod q, where t i is the latest timestamp. The signature of the message M i is σ i = (R i , S i ). Finally, the message (VID i , U pk , M i , t i , σ i ) is sent to the Road Site Units(RSU).
• Individual verification: When the data (VID i , U pk , M i , t i , σ i ) from V i is received, RSU verifies the signature by the following equation
If the validation passes, the data is received.
• Batch verification: When the data (
can perform batch validation by the following equation (
where v i ∈ [1, 2 l ] is a random small integer. If the validation passes, the data is received.
III. MODEL AND DEFINITION
A. SYSTEM MODEL In this part, the system model of our scheme is introduced. The system model involves three entities: mobile multimedia entity, data collection unit and data center as shown in Figure 1 .
• Mobile multimedia entity (MME): MMEs are the terminal entities of the system. MMEs are employed to collect users' mobile multimedia data and report periodically to the Data collection unit(DCU). Each user in the system is equipped with an MME. Therefore, in the paper, users and MMEs are indistinguishable.
• Data collection unit (DCU): DCU is responsible for collecting data from MMEs, aggregating them and sending them to the data center. DCU also forwards data packages between DC and MMEs.
• Data center (DC): DC is responsible for generating blinding factors for MMEs and collecting data from DCU. Through the analysis of massive multimedia data, DC can make reasonable decisions, such as preferences and behavioral habits of user group, in order to better serve users. In addition, the storage capacity of DC is unrestricted. In the system, The transmitted data includes multimedia data types, data amounts, and other related multimedia data information. In this paper, data flow in the system is bidirectional. Close-range transmission between MMEs and DCU can be connected through wireless networks. Long-distance transmission between DCU and DC can be achieved through a LTE-A network. As a result, DC is able to obtain total users' multimedia data and do not learn personal multimedia data.
B. SECURITY MODEL AND DESIGN GOALS
Data injection attacks, DoS attacks, time synchronization attacks and other physical attacks are very common [35] , [36] . In order to resist these attacks, the confidentiality, authentication and integrity of data should be guaranteed. In addition, the privacy of personal multimedia data is also very significant. The adversaries can infer the user's living habits through the user's multimedia data. DC and DCU are considered honest but curious. Both DC and DCU want to obtain the multimedia data of individual users. MMEs are legitimate users, but there will be malicious users pretending to be legitimate users.
• Privacy: The individual multimedia data of users in the system should be protected. Neither DC nor DCU knows the individual multimedia data.
• Authentication: To ensure that the data received is legitimate, the authenticity of the data should be guaran- teed. If a malicious user impersonates a legitimate user, the data should be rejected.
• Integrity: To ensure the correctness of the data during transmission, the completeness of data should be guaranteed. If the data is tampered with, the data should be found.
C. DEFINITION OF ALGORITHMS
In this section, we introduce the definition of algorithms. Our scheme consists of eight algorithms as follows.
•
It takes a security parameter λ as input and generates its public-private key pair (Y DC , α) and public parameters PP.
• Partial private key extraction
It takes public parameters PP as input and generates MME's partial public-private key pair (Q ID i , psk ID i ), DCU's partial public-private key pair (Q ID i , psk ID i ) and (Q A i , A i ) which can be used to generate the aggregate area.
• Key generation (PP) → (MME pk i , MME sk i , DCU pk i , DCU sk i ): It takes public parameters PP as input and generates MME's public-private key pair (MME pk i , MME sk i ) and DCU's public-private key pair (DCU pk i , DCU sk i ).
• Aggregation area creation (PP,
It takes public parameters PP, the identity ID i of the MME, the partial public key vpk ID i of the MME, the public key Y DC of DC and (Q A i , A i ) which can be used to generate the aggregate area as input. It outputs the group public key (GK ) of the aggregation area.
It takes public parameters PP and data m i as input and outputs the ciphertext (C a i , C b i ) of the data m i , the signature σ i of the corresponding ciphertext and the current timestamp t. corresponding ciphertext as input and outputs the aggregated data (C a , C b ), the aggregated ciphertext signature σ DCU and the current timestamp t DCU .
• Distributed decryption (PP, ID DCU , C a , C b , σ DCU , t DCU ) → (sum): It takes public parameters PP, the identity ID DCU of DCU, the aggregated data (C a , C b ), the aggregated ciphertext signature σ DCU and the cuttent timestamp t DCU as input and generates the total multimedia data sum.
• Track (PP, C a , vpk ID i , D i ) → pass or fail: It takes public parameters PP, the aggregated data C a , the partial public key of the MME and the signature D i generated by the MME using its private key as input, If the verification is passed, it outputs pass, otherwise outputs fail.
IV. THE PROPOSED SCHEME
The proposed scheme which is described below includes eight algorithms.
A. SYSTEM SETUP
The setup algorithm which is used to generate the system parameters, is run by DC as shown in Figure 2 . Given a security parameter λ, p and q are two large prime numbers. Then DC instantiates an elliptic curve
DC generates a group G of the order q with a point P from the elliptic curve E. Then DC randomly selects α ∈ Z * q and calculates Y DC = αP. DC's public-private key pair is (Y DC , α). DC picks random numbers π 1 , π 2 , ..., π n ∈ Z * q and calculates π = 
B. PARTIAL PRIVATE KEY EXTRACTION
The partial private key extraction algorithm which is used to generate the partial private keys of MME and DCU, is run by MME, DC and DCU as shown in Figure 3 . MME i randomly selects k i ∈ Z * q and then calculates ID i = k i P. Then ID i is sent to DC through a secure channel. When DC receives the data from MME i , it randomly chooses d i ∈ Z * q and calculates Q ID i = d i P. Then, the partial secret key of MME i is
DC chooses randomly a i ∈ Z * q , and then calculates Q A i = a i P and
DCU selects u i ∈ Z * q and then calculates ID DCU = u i P. Then ID DCU is sent to DC through a secure channel. When DC receives ID DCU from DCU, it randomly selects d i ∈ Z * q and calculates Q ID i = d i P. Then, the partial secret key of DCU is
Finally, DC will send (Q ID i , psk ID i ) to DCU through a secure channel.
C. KEY GENERATION
The key generation algorithm which is used to generate the public-private key pairs of MME and DCU, is run by MME and DCU as shown in Figure 4 . , vsk ID i ) ).
MME i selects randomly x ID i ∈ Z

D. AGGREGATION AREA CREATION
The aggregation area creation algorithm which is used to form an aggregation area, is run by n MMEs as shown in Figure 5 . 
(1) Then, the group public key of the aggregated area is
E. CIPHERTEXT GENERATION
The ciphertext generation algorithm is run by MME to generate the ciphertext of the data and the corresponding signature as shown in Figure 6 . MME i encrypts the collected data m i . MME i selects a random number r i ∈ Z * q and calculates the ciphertext
where t is the current timestamp. Then MME i chooses a random number y i ∈ Z * q , and calculates R i = y i P,
F. CIPHERTEXT AGGREGATION
The ciphertext aggregation algorithm which is used to generate the aggregated ciphertext and the corresponding signature, is run by DCU as shown in Figure 6 .
. DCU first validates the validity of data by the following equation
where
where v i ∈ [1, 2 l ] is a random small integer. DCU aggregates data by the equation
where r = n i=1 r i and sum = n i=1 m i . Next, the aggregated ciphertext is signed by using the secret key of DCU. DCU selects a random number r i ∈ Z * q , then computes R i = r i P,
where t DCU is the current timestamp. Then, the aggregated ciphertext signature is σ DCU = (R i , S i ). Finally, the data (ID DCU , C a , C b , t DCU , σ DCU ) is sent to DC.
G. DISTRIBUTED DECRYPTION
The distributed decryption algorithm is run by DC to recover the total multimedia data as shown in Figure 7 . When the data (ID DCU , C a , C b , t DCU , σ DCU ) from DCU is received, DC verifies the signature by the following equation where
If the validation passes, the data is received. MME i uses its secret key to perform the distributed decryption by the equation D i = x ID i C a , and it uses its own private key to sign it. MME i selects randomly y i ∈ Z * q , calculates
wheret is the current timestamp. The signature of D i is
Then the data (ID i , D i ,t, σ i ) is forwarded to DC by DCU. DC receives the data and then performs batch validation by the equation
where v i ∈ [1, 2 l ] is a random small integer. If the validation is passed, the total multimedia data from MMEs can be recovered by the equation
H. TRACK
The track algorithm is run by DC to verify the correctness of data sent by MME during the distributed decryption phase.
If MME i sends incorrect data during distributed decryption phase, the equation C a vpk ID i = D i P can be used to validate it.
V. ANALYSIS
We analyze our scheme mainly from the following two aspects of this section: correctness and security.
A. CORRECTNESS ANALYSIS
We mainly consider the correctness of our scheme from the following aspects. MME verifies the message sent by other multimedia entities through Equation 1 in the aggregation area creation phase. The correctness of the equation verified the validity of the message can be shown as follows:
In the ciphertext aggregation phase, DCU needs to validate the validity of data from MME i by Equation 2. The correctness of the equation verified the validity of data can be shown as follows:
In the distributed decryption phase, DC verifies the signature by Equation 3 . The correctness of the equation verified the validity of the signature can be shown as follows:
Besides, in the distributed decryption phase, DC performs batch validation by Equation 4 . The correctness of the equation of batch validation can be shown as follows:
B. SECURITY ANALYSIS
The proposed scheme should ensure privacy, authentication and integrity of personal multimedia data.
• Privacy: Firstly, the privacy of personal data m i is guaranteed by the EC-ELGamal encryption mechanism [33] . MME sends the data (
to DCU through open channels. if adversaries want to obtain m i , the computational Diffie-Hallman (CDH) hard problem [37] needs to be solved. Specifically, if the adversary wants to get m i from C b i = m i P + r i GK + H 3 (t) · π i , he needs to calculate
However, with public parameters (P, C a i , vpk ID i , ..., vpk ID n , t), it is difficult for an adversary to obtain
In short, m i is secure even if the adversary obtains the message (ID
. Secondly, our scheme can also resist collusion attack among DC, DCU and MMEs. In the worst case, MME i (i = 1, ..., n−1) can participate in the collusion with DC and DCU to attack MME n . In order to deduce m n from (C a n , C b n ), the colluders need to calculate
However, r n GK cannot be recovered by the colluders without x n and π n . So the scheme can resist the collusion attack. Besides, DC can't obtain the total multimedia data without interacting with all MMEs [30] . Finally, for the DC, it is computationally infeasible to calculate an aggregated subset of multimedia aggregated data sum. Assume that the corresponding ciphertext of the data m i is (
and send it to DC, where
DC wants to get sum * , it must calculate
where solve the CDH problem. Therefore, except for the sum of {m 1 , m 2 , m i , . . . , m n }, the sum of any other subset of {m 1 , m 2 , m i , . . . , m n } cannot be obtained by DC.
• Authentication and Integrity: Suppose there are two valid signature information (σ i , σ * i ) generated by the MME i with the same random element, where
If the adversary tries to fake the message signature, the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP) should be solved. In the process of data transmission, the certificateless signature technology is employed, which can achieve data authentication and integrity.
In our scheme, all data from MMEs and DCUs are signed by using the signature technology in [31] , which is based on the computational ECDLP and proved to be unforgeable against an adaptive chosen-message.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
The performance of our scheme will be evaluated by comparing with Liu et al.'s scheme [30] . In our scheme and scheme [30] , it is assumed that DC has strong computing power. When evaluating the computational cost, only the computational cost at terminal entities and DCU are compared. In the process of evaluation, hash operation and point addition operation on field E(F p ) are neglected. Table 2 defines some symbols of related operations and tests their respective running time on the same platform [31] . Each terminal entity performs the aggregation area creation algorithm, the ciphertext generation algorithm and the distributed decryption algorithm. During the aggregation area creation phase in our scheme, the terminal entity needs to verify the correctness of the messages sent by other terminal entities and generate the group public key GK of the aggregation area. The computational overhead incurred in this phase is 2T em . While the computational overhead incurred during this phase in scheme [30] is 2T p . In the ciphertext generation phase of our scheme, the terminal entity needs to generate the ciphertext (C a i , C b i ) of the data and the signature σ i of the corresponding ciphertext. The computational cost is 4T em in this phase. While the computational cost in scheme [30] is 5T em during this phase. In the distributed decryption phase of our scheme, the terminal entity needs to calculate D i and the corresponding signature σ i . The computational cost is 2T em in this phase. While the computational cost in scheme [30] is 3T em during this phase. The computational overhead of terminal entity at each phase is shown in Table 3 . In these three phases, the total computing overhead of each terminal entity in our scheme is 8T em . While the total computing overhead of each terminal entity in scheme [30] is 2T p + 8T em in these three phases. DCU only involves the ciphertext aggregation phase. In the ciphertext aggregation phase of our scheme, the DCU needs to verify the correctness of the message sent by the terminal entity and generate the aggregate ciphertext (C a , C b ) and the corresponding signature σ DCU . As shown in Table 4 , DCU costs (2n + 2)T esm + T em in our scheme, and costs 3T p + (n + 2)T em in scheme [30] .
The following is a more intuitive performance comparison between scheme [30] and our scheme. Figure 9 and Figure 10 compare the computing overhead of the terminal entity between scheme [30] and our scheme. In Figure 8 , it can be seen that during the creation of the aggregation area phase, the computational overhead of the terminal entity increases with the increase of the number of aggregation area. However, it is obvious that the calculation of the terminal entity of scheme [30] is larger than our scheme. In Figures 9 and 10 , it can be seen that in the ciphertext generation and distributed decryption phases, the computational overhead of the terminal entity increases with the increase of the amount of data. However, the calculation of the terminal entity of scheme [30] is slightly larger than our scheme. Figure 11 compare the computing overhead of the DCU between our scheme and the scheme [30] . Obviously, it can be seen that in the ciphertext generation phase, the computational cost of our scheme is lightweight. This is mainly because our scheme does not involve time-consuming bilinear pairing operations. Therefore, compared with scheme [30] , our scheme has better computing performance.
VII. CONCLUSION
A lightweight and privacy-preserving data aggregation scheme for mobile multimedia security is presented to balance the utility of multimedia big data and personal multimedia data in this paper. In the proposed scheme, the privacy of the user's multimedia data can be protected, and the calculation of MMEs and DCU is lightweight. There are no certificate management issues for a large number of MMEs. Improving the communication cost of the system will be our next step. 
